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Abstract
When modeling a decision problem using the influence diagram framework, the quantitative part
rests on two principal components: probabilities for representing the decision maker’s uncertainty
about the domain and utilities for representing preferences. Over the last decade, several methods
have been developed for learning the probabilities from a database. However, methods for learning
the utilities have only received limited attention in the computer science community.
A promising approach for learning a decision maker’s utility function is to take outset in the de-
cision maker’s observed behavioral patterns, and then find a utility function which (together with a
domain model) can explain this behavior. That is, it is assumed that decision maker’s preferences
are reflected in the behavior. Standard learning algorithms also assume that the decision maker is be-
havioral consistent, i.e., given a model of the decision problem, there exists a utility function which
can account for all the observed behavior. Unfortunately, this assumption is rarely valid in real-world
decision problems, and in these situations existing learning methods may only identify a trivial utility
function. In this paper we relax this consistency assumption, and propose two algorithms for learning
a decision maker’s utility function from possibly inconsistent behavior; inconsistent behavior is inter-
preted as random deviations from an underlying (true) utility function. The main difference between
the two algorithms is that the first facilitates a form of batch learning whereas the second focuses
on adaptation and is particularly well-suited for scenarios where the DM’s preferences change over
time. Empirical results demonstrate the tractability of the algorithms, and they also show that the
algorithms converge toward the true utility function for even very small sets of observations.
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When modeling a decision problem using the influence diagram framework [10] we
need to specify both a qualitative part (represented by a acyclic directed graph) and a
quantitative part. The quantitative part is comprised of probabilities which represent the
decision maker’s (DM’s) uncertainty about the domain, and utilities which represent the
DM’s preferences about the different outcomes of the decision problem.
The specification of the quantitative part of the model constitutes one of the main dif-
ficulties when modeling a decision problem using the influence diagram representation.
Over the last decade, research has focused on learning the probabilities from a database
(see, e.g., [4] for an overview), however, automatic learning of the utilities has received
less attention. For sequential decision problems, this task was first addressed by Sargent
[23] within the economics community. Sargent [23] considered the problem of estimating
(among other parameters) the cost of adjusting the daytime and overtime labor force by
observing a firm’s labor demand. In a more general context, there has been an increas-
ing interest in techniques for structural estimation of Markov decision processes (MDPs),
see [22] and the references within. For instance, Keane and Wolpin [15] estimates a dy-
namic model for schooling, work and occupational choice of young men.
In general, current approaches for semi-automatic learning of a DM’s utility function
have focused on three different areas: (i) eliciting the utility function of the DM based on
a database of already elicited utility functions [5,6], (ii) iterative refinement of the DM’s
current utility function using a value of information approach [8], and (iii) eliciting the
utility function based on a database of observed behavioral patterns [7,18,22,27]. The latter
approach is based on the assumption that the DM’s “true” utility function is reflected in the
observed behavior.
In this paper we focus on the third category within the framework of influence diagrams,
i.e., learning a DM’s utility function from her observed behavioral patterns. Unfortunately,
the estimation techniques for MDPs cannot directly be applied to frameworks such as in-
fluence diagrams, although some of the ideas carry over. Moreover, existing ID learning
methods are based on the assumptions that the model provides an accurate representation
of the problem domain, and that the DM is an expected utility maximizer always with the
same von Neuman–Morgenstern utility function.1 These assumptions, however, are rarely
valid in practice. For example, humans rarely behave as to maximize the expected utility
w.r.t. a certain model [1], and the utility function of a DM may fluctuate and/or change
permanently over time. As a consequence, traditional learning methods may only be able
to identify a trivial utility function (i.e., a utility function giving the same utility to all out-
comes), but this type of utility function is hardly an appropriate description of the DM’s
preferences.
1 Together, these two assumptions imply that the DM is behavioral consistent, i.e., given a model of the
decision problem, there exists a utility function which can account for all the observed behavior.
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In this paper we relax the assumptions above, and propose two algorithms for learning
the “true” utility function of a DM by observing possibly inconsistent behavior, i.e., be-
havior which cannot be explained by a non-trivial utility function.2 The first algorithm can
be characterized as a batch learning procedure whereas the second algorithm focuses on
adaptation. The assumption underlying both of the proposed algorithms is that inconsistent
behavior can be explained as random deviations from an underlying true utility function
which is the one we would like to estimate.
A promising feature of the proposed algorithms follows from the fact that a given
observation-decision sequence truncates the space of possible utility functions. Hence, we
would in general expect that even a small database can be used to learn a reasonable ap-
proximation of the DM’s true utility function. That this is also the case is confirmed by
several empirical experiments, where it is also shown that the algorithms are even robust
to deviations from the underlying utility model. This observation also points to another
possible application area, namely adaptive agents in, e.g., computer games. That is, agents
which can adapt to the behavior of other computer controlled agents as well as avatars. In
these types of domains we usually have very limited amounts of data for the individual
agents, thereby making it difficult to apply traditional machine learning algorithms when
performing learning or adaptation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the frame-
work of influence diagrams and introduce some of the terms and notation used throughout
the paper. In Section 3 we pose the general problem of learning a DM’s utility function
and we outline some existing learning algorithms. Section 4 discusses a utility model for
explaining inconsistent behavior, and based on this model we propose two algorithms for
learning a utility function from possibly inconsistent behavior; the first algorithm is a batch
learning procedure whereas the second algorithm provides a method for doing adaptation.
In Section 5 we present several empirical results which demonstrate the applicability of
both algorithms. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss some optimization issues and point to
areas for future research.
2. Influence diagrams
An influence diagram (ID) can be seen as a Bayesian network (BN) augmented with
decision nodes and value nodes, where value nodes have no descendants. Thus, an ID is a
acyclic directed graph G = (U,E), where the nodes U can be partitioned into three disjoint
subsets; chance nodes UC , decision nodes UD and value nodes UV .
In the remainder of this paper we assume a total ordering of the decision nodes, in-
dicating the order in which the decisions are made (the ordering of the decision nodes
is traditionally represented by a directed path which includes all decision nodes). Fur-
thermore, we will use the concept of node and variable interchangeably if this does not
introduce any inconsistency. We will also assume that no barren nodes are specified by the
2 See [22] for a discussion of this problem in the context of MDPs, where inconsistent behavior is attributed
to unobserved state variables.
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ID since they have no impact on the decisions, see [24]; a chance node or a decision node
is said to be barren if it has no children, or if all its descendants are barren.
With each chance variable and decision variable X we associate a state space sp(X)
which denotes the set of possible outcomes/decision options for X. For a set U ′ of chance
variables and decision variables we define the state space as sp(U ′) = ×{sp(X) | X ∈
U ′}, where A × B denotes the Cartesian product of A and B . The uncertainty associ-
ated with each chance variable C is represented by a conditional probability potential
P(C | pa(C)) : sp({C} ∪ pa(C)) → [0;1], where pa(C) denotes the parents of C in the
ID. The domain of a conditional probability potential φC = P(C | pa(C)) is denoted
dom(φC) = {C} ∪ pa(C).
The DM’s preferences are described by a multi-attribute utility potential, and in the re-
mainder of this paper we shall assume that this utility potential is linearly-additive with
equal weights, see, e.g., [28]. The set of value nodes UV defines the set of utility poten-
tials which appear as additive components in the multi-attribute utility potential.3 Each
utility potential indicates the local utility for a given configuration of the variables in its
domain. The domain of a utility potential ψV is denoted dom(ψV ) = pa(V ), where V is
the value node associated with ψV . Analogously to the concepts of variable and node we
shall sometimes use the terms value node and utility potential interchangeably.
A realization of an ID, I , is an attachment of potentials to the appropriate variables
in I , i.e., a realization is a set {P(C | pa(C)) | C ∈ UC} ∪ {ψV (pa(V )) | V ∈ UV }. So,
a realization specifies the quantitative part of the model whereas the ID constitutes the
qualitative part.
The arcs in an ID can be partitioned into three disjoint subsets, corresponding to the
type of node they go into. Arcs into value nodes represent functional dependencies by
indicating the domain of the associated utility potential. Arcs into chance nodes, termed
dependency arcs, represent probabilistic dependencies, whereas arcs into decision nodes,
termed informational arcs, imply information precedence; if there is an arc from a node X
to a decision node D, then the state of X is known when decision D is made.
Let UC be the set of chance variables and let UD = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} be the set of
decision variables. Assuming that the decision variables are ordered by index, the set
of informational arcs induces a partitioning of UC into a collection of disjoint subsets
C0,C1, . . . ,Cn. The set Cj denotes the chance variables observed between decision Dj and
Dj+1. Thus the variables in Cj occur as immediate predecessors of Dj+1. This induces a
partial order ≺ on UC ∪ UD , i.e., C0 ≺ D1 ≺ C1 ≺ · · · ≺ Dn ≺ Cn.
The set of variables known to the decision maker when deciding on Dj is called the
informational predecessors of Dj and is denoted pred(Dj ). By assuming that the decision
maker remembers all previous observations and decisions, we have pred(Di) ⊆ pred(Dj )
(for Di ≺ Dj ) and in particular, pred(Dj ) is the variables that occur before Dj under ≺.
This property is known as no-forgetting and from this we can assume that an ID does not
contain any no-forgetting arcs, i.e., pa(Di) ∩ pa(Dj ) = ∅ if Di 
= Dj .
3 Note that Tatman and Shachter [28] also consider the case where the utility is defined as the product of a set
of utility potentials; such a utility potential can be transformed to decompose additively by taking the logarithm
of the utilities.
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2.1. EvaluationWhen evaluating an ID we identify a strategy for the decisions involved; a strategy can
be seen as a prescription of responses to earlier observations and decisions. The evaluation
is usually performed according to the maximum expected utility principle, which states that
we should always choose an alternative that maximizes the expected utility.
Definition 1. Let I be an ID and let UD denote the decision variables in I . A strategy is a
set of functions ∆ = {δD | D ∈ UD}, where δD is a policy given by:
δD : sp
(
pred(D)
)→ sp(D).
A strategy that maximizes the expected utility is termed an optimal strategy, and each
policy in an optimal strategy is termed an optimal policy.
The optimal policy for the last decision variable Dn is given by:4
δDn(C0,D1, . . . ,Dn−1,Cn−1)
= arg max
Dn
∑
Cn
P (Cn | C0,D1, . . . ,Cn−1,Dn)
∑
V∈UV
ψV .
Similarly, the maximum expected utility for decision Dn is
ρDn(C0,D1, . . . ,Dn−1,Cn−1)
= max
Dn
∑
Cn
P (Cn | C0,D1, . . . ,Cn−1,Dn)
∑
V∈UV
ψV . (1)
In general, the optimal policy for a decision variable Dk is given by:
δDk (C0,D1, . . . ,Dk−1,Ck−1)
= arg max
Dk
∑
Ck
P (Ck | C0,D1, . . . ,Ck−1,Dk)ρDk+1 , (2)
where ρDk+1 is the maximum expected utility potential for decision Dk+1:
ρDk+1(C0,D1, . . . ,Dk,Ck)
= max
Dk+1
∑
Ck+1
P(Ck+1 | C0,D1, . . . ,Ck,Dk+1)ρDk+2 .
If we suppress the maximization over Dk+1, we obtain the expected utility potential for
decision Dk+1:
ρ(Dk+1,C0,D1, . . . ,Dk,Ck) =
∑
Ck+1
P(Ck+1 | C0,D1, . . . ,Ck,Dk+1)ρDk+2 . (3)
4 For the sake of simplifying notation we shall assume that for all decision variables Di there is always exactly
one element in arg maxDi (·).
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The optimal policy for a decision variable, Dk , is in principle a function over the entire
past of Dk (i.e., pred(Dk)). However, not all the variables observed do necessarily influence
the optimal policy for Dk , hence we introduce the notion of a required variable:
Definition 2. Let I be an ID and let D be a decision variable in I . The variable X ∈
pred(D) is said to be required for D if there exists a realization of I , a configuration y¯
over dom(δD)\{X}, and two states x1 and x2 of X s.t. δD(x1, y¯) 
= δD(x2, y¯). The set of
variables required for D is denoted req(D).
Different algorithms for identifying the required variables have been proposed by
Shachter [25], Nielsen and Jensen [19] and Lauritzen and Nilsson [16]. For example, the
algorithm by Shachter [25] traverse the decision variables in reverse temporal order. When
a decision variable is visited its required past is determined and the decision variable is
then substituted by a chance variable having the required variables as parents:
Definition 3. Let D be a decision variable and let δD(req(D)) be an optimal policy
for D. A chance variable D′ with req(D) as parents and with the probability potential
P(D′ | req(D)) defined as:
P(d | π) =
{
1 if δD(π) = d,
0 otherwise
is said to be the chance variable representation of δD .
Thus, we only need to (iteratively) determine the required variables for the last deci-
sion variable Dn. For this decision variable it can be shown that a variable X ∈ pred(Dn)
is required for Dn if and only if X is d-connected to a utility descendant of Dn given
pred(Dn) \ {X}.
3. Observed behavior as utility constraints
Consider an influence diagram, I , modeling some decision problem, where the DM’s
preferences are expressed by a utility function ψ . Given this influence diagram represen-
tation, the DM’s observed behavior can be seen as an observation-decision sequence (or
behavioral pattern) w.r.t. the variables in I ; for each decision D we have a configuration
over the set of variables which is comprised of D and the variables which are observed
immediately before D. Such an observation-decision sequence is necessarily consistent
with at least one strategy ∆′, and we therefore introduce the notion of an instantiation of a
strategy.
Definition 4. Let I be an ID and let ∆ be a strategy for the decision variables in I . Let I ′
be the BN obtained from I (value nodes are ignored) by replacing all decision variables in
I with chance variable representations of their policies in ∆ (see Definition 3). A configu-
ration c over the variables
⋃
D∈UD(req(D) ∪ {D}) is then said to be an instantiation of ∆
if P ′(c) > 0, where P ′(·) is the probability distribution encoded by I ′.
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Definition 5. Let I be an ID and let ψ be a utility function for I . If ∆ is an optimal strategy
for I w.r.t. ψ and c is an instantiation of ∆, then c is said to be an instantiation of I w.r.t.
ψ (or ψ induces c). For a set D = {c1, . . . , cN } of instantiations we say that ψ induces D
if ψ induces ci , for all 1 i N .
Obviously, for any utility function we may have several different instantiations w.r.t.
the utility function in question. Moreover, for any instantiation c we do not have a unique
utility function inducing c, since a utility function is only unique up to a positive affine
transformation. Note that if the optimal strategy is not required to be strictly optimal, then
any instantiation may be induced by a trivial utility function (a utility function giving the
same utility to all outcomes).
Assume now that we have a database D = {c1, . . . , cN } of observed behavioral patterns
for some DM; this corresponds to the situation where the DM is repeatedly confronted
with the same decision problem, e.g., a doctor diagnosing and treating patients. Given that
the DM is an expected utility maximizer, always with the same von Neuman–Morgenstern
utility function, an obvious approach for identifying a representation of the utility function
which induces D would be to investigate the set ΨD of candidate utility functions:
ΨD = {ψ | ψ induces ci ,∀1 i N}. (4)
If the database encodes an entire strategy, then we can easily find this set of candidate
utility functions: Start off by substituting each decision variable with its chance variable
representation as encoded by the cases in D (see Definition 3). Next, consider the last
decision variable Dn and assume that case c specifies {Dn} ∪ req(Dn) = (d,πDn) that is,
c↓{Dn}∪req(Dn) = (d,πDn). This gives us:
ρ(d,πDn) ρ(d ′,πDn), ∀d ′ ∈ sp(Dn) \ {d}. (5)
From Eq. (1), the expected utility function for the last decision is given by:
ρ
(
Dn, req(Dn)
)=∑
Cn
P
(
Cn | Dn,pred(Dn)
) ∑
V∈UV
ψV
(
pa(V )
)
=
∑
Cn
P
(
Cn | Dn, req(Dn)
) ∑
V∈UV
ψV
(
pa(V )
)
=
∑
V∈UV
∑
Cn
P
(
Cn | Dn, req(Dn)
)
ψV
(
pa(V )
)
=
∑
V∈UV
∑
Cn∩pa(V )
ψV
(
pa(V )
) ∑
Cn\pa(V )
P
(
Cn | Dn, req(Dn)
)
=
∑
V∈UV
∑
Cn∩pa(V )
ψV
(
pa(V )
)
P
(
Cn ∩ pa(V ) | Dn, req(Dn)
)
. (6)
Thus, for any configuration (d,πDn) over {Dn} ∪ req(Dn) the expected utility is linear in
the utilities, and inequality (5) therefore defines a set of linear constraints for the utility
function. Moreover all the coefficients for the inequalities can be found by instantiating the
corresponding variables and performing one outward propagation in the strong junction
tree representation of the ID [11,17]; from the construction of the strong junction tree
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we are guaranteed that at least one clique contains pa(V ) from which P(Cn ∩ pa(V ) |
d,πDn) can directly be read. Finally, as all decision variables have been substituted with
their chance variable representations we can perform the analysis above for each decision
variable by moving in reverse temporal order. This also implies that in order to find a set
of candidate utility functions we simply need to solve the collection of linear inequalities
identified during the analysis. Unfortunately this approach relies on the entire strategy to
be encoded in the database which is very unlikely to happen in practice. When only a
partial strategy is described by the database, then the constraints specified by the observed
behavior are no longer linear and the above procedure cannot be applied. This can easily be
seen by noticing that for any unobserved configuration of the required past for a decision
variable, we need to apply a maximization when eliminating that variable; the expected
utility function for a decision variable in the required past for that variable will therefore
no longer be linear (we shall return to this discussion in Section 6).
Now assume that we are given a set of candidate utility functions, and we would like
to reason about the DM preferences. One approach would be to select one of the can-
didate utility functions as a representation of the DM’s unknown utility function; by the
assumptions above we are guaranteed that such a utility function exists. This approach has
been pursued by, e.g., Suryadi and Gmytrasiewicz [27] who propose an adaptation scheme
where a single utility function is found by using a method similar to the delta rule for learn-
ing neural networks. Ng and Russell [18] propose heuristics for discriminating among the
different candidate utility functions in the context of Markov decision processes. Alterna-
tively, Chajewska et al. [7] derive a procedure for estimating a probability distribution over
the candidate utility functions. The approach by Chajewska et al. [7] is based on specifying
a prior probability distribution for the utilities, and then applying a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo technique for sampling from this truncated distribution; the distribution is truncated
according to the constraints imposed by the observed behavior. Note that both Ng and Rus-
sell [18] and Chajewska et al. [7] consider the situation when the optimal strategy is fully
observed as well as when it is only partially observed.
Unfortunately, the assumptions underlying the methods referenced above are rarely
valid in real world decision problems: (i) the ID model may not provide an accurate de-
scription of the decision problem, see, e.g., [22,26], (ii) the DM’s preferences may fluctuate
and/or change permanently over time, and (iii) human DMs do not always behave as to
maximize the expected utility [1,14]. In these situations, the observed behavior of the DM
may appear inconsistent w.r.t. the ID in question, i.e., there may not exist a non-trivial util-
ity function for the ID which satisfies all the constraints implied by the observed behavior.
As a consequence, existing learning methods would only identify a trivial utility function
which is inadequate for, e.g., reasoning about the future behavior of the DM. Note that this
problem has previously been considered in the context of MDPs [22], where discrepancies
in the observation-decision sequences are attributed to the occurrence of unobserved state
variables. In this setting, the parameters are estimated by maximizing (using a nested fixed
point algorithm) the likelihood function for the observed behavior.
In what follows we establish a utility model which accommodates situation (i) and (ii);
as a special case, the model also includes the situation where the previous stated assump-
tions do hold. Based on this model we propose two methods for learning a DM’s utility
function by observing (possibly) inconsistent behavioral patterns. The discussion of (iii) is
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postponed until Section 6, where the model is briefly discussed in relation to the rank
dependent utility model by Quiggin [21].
4. Learning a utility function from inconsistent behavior
In the proposed utility model, it is assumed that the DM has an underlying (true) utility
function (denoted ψ∗) and that any type of inconsistent behavior can be explained as de-
viations from ψ∗.5 More precisely, consider a database of cases D = {c1, . . . , cN } from an
ID I . In the proposed model, each case ci is assumed to be an instantiation of I w.r.t. some
utility function ψci obtained from ψ∗ by adding some white noise. Hence, each case, ci , is
an instantiation of an optimal strategy found w.r.t. the utility function ψci generated from
ψ∗; for each outcome o, we have ψci (o) = ψ∗(o)+ εo, where εo has a normal distribution
with zero mean and variance σ 2o . Hence, by assuming that the noise associated with the
utilities are marginally independent, and that the variance only depends on the outcome in
question we get
ψci =
∑
V∈UV
ψ
ci
V =
∑
V∈UV
(
ψ∗V + εciV
)
, (7)
where εciV (o
↓pa(V )) ∼ N(0, σ 2
o↓pa(V ) ). Note that we implicit assume that ψ
ci decomposes
additively in the same factors as ψ∗. A graphical representation of the utility model (with
m utility parameters in the true utility function) is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the nodes
c1, . . . , cN are information nodes that encode the observed behavior; the independence
statements can be deduced in the usual fashion.
Thus, for each parameter, ψ∗j , in the true utility function we have a variance, σ 2j , and
a corresponding utility parameter, ψcij , for each case ci . Note that the model does not
make any assumptions about the type of prior probability distribution of the true utility
function and the variance of the parameters. Moreover, the model facilitates an easy way to
encode prior information about the DM’s preferences. For instance, given that we have the
prior information that oi ≺ oj , then we can take this information into account by simply
Fig. 1. A graphical representation of the utility model for encoding inconsistent behavior.
5 This assumption can also be seen in relation to (i) as well as the discussion by [26] who argue that uncer-
tainties in the model can be encoded in the utility function.
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specifying ψ∗(oi) < ψ∗(oj ); thus changing the independence statements in the model,
making it a chain graph.
Each constraint induced by an observed behavioral pattern specifies the set of candidate
utility functions for the corresponding case. Given a prior probability distribution for the
true utility function, we can then, in principle, use the set, D, of cases to obtain a posterior
probability distribution P(ψ∗ | D) for the true utility function. In turn, this probability
distribution can be used to calculate the expected value of each parameter in the true utility
function, which could be used as a representation of the DM’s actual utility function.
Unfortunately, even if the prior distribution for the true utility function has a “nice”
closed form expression, the posterior may not be on closed form nor may it belong to
some specific family of probability distributions. To overcome this problem we can instead
apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique, where we generate samples from the desired
distribution. For instance, assume that the databaseD consists of N cases {c1, . . . , cN } and
that we are interested in computing the expected value of each utility parameter. That is,
we seek:6
E[ψ∗j |D] =
1∫
ψ∗j =0
ψ∗j P (ψ∗j |D)dψ∗j , ∀1 j m, (8)
and this expectation can be approximated by:
E[ψ∗j |D] ≈
1
n
n∑
k=1
xk, (9)
where {x1, . . . , xn} are sampled from P(ψ∗j |D).
A naïve approach to generating these samples would be to construct a Markov Chain
according to the model in Fig. 1. Thus the state space of the chain would correspond to the
hyper-cube [0;1]d , where d = m · (N +1). That is, the dimensionality of the hyper-cube is
proportional to the number utilities; for each utility parameter ψ∗j in the true utility function
we have the set {σ 2j ,ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj } of parameters. When sampling from the Markov Chain
we can then discard any sample that does not satisfy the instantiations; this can be deter-
mined (without considering computational complexity) by inserting the proposed utility
function in the ID and then testing whether the associated case is included in the optimal
strategy. Thus, using this state space we can directly generate samples from the posterior
distribution of the true utility function which can then be used to, e.g., approximate the
expected value of each utility parameter in the true utility function (see Eq. (9)). Observe,
that even though we are only interested in sampling from the true utility function we still
need to include all the utility parameters associated with the different cases in the data-
base. This also reveals the main computational problem with this approach: the hyper-cube
grows exponentially in the number of cases, and we therefore need a large set of samples
in order to get an adequate approximation of the posterior probability.
6 The assumption that the utility parameters only take on values in the interval [0;1] is not a restriction, since
any utility function can be transformed to this scale.
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In the following sections we present two alternative methods for calculating the ex-
pected value of each parameter in the true utility function as well as updating the prior
distributions for the parameters in the true utility function and the variance. The first
method considers the situation where we calculate the expectations by considering all the
cases simultaneously (a form of batch learning), and the second method deals with the
situation where the cases are considered in sequence, thereby facilitating an adaptation
scheme. Both methods rely on a Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique, and details hereof
are described in Section 4.3.
4.1. Method 1
In order to avoid the computational difficulty of the method described above, we can
exploit some of the independence properties of the model in Fig. 1 when calculating
E[ψ∗j |D] =
∫
ψ∗j
ψ∗j P (ψ∗j |D)dψ∗j , ∀1 j m.
First of all, we shall assume that the prior distribution of each parameter, ψ∗j , in the true
utility function and its associated precision, τj = 1/σ 2j , follows a normal-gamma distri-
bution (which is a conjugate distribution for the normal distribution): The conditional
distribution of ψ∗j given τj and the (user specified) parameter λ0j is a normal distribution
with mean µ0j and precision λ
0
j τj , whereas the marginal distribution for τj is a gamma
distribution with parameters α0j and β
0
j . Note that λ
0
j can be seen as a virtual sample size,
which can be used to control the variance of the distribution. We shall also assume that
P(ψ
ci
j |D) ≈ P(ψcij | ci ) is approximately correct. The accuracy of this approximation is
heavily dependent on the strength of the dependence between ψ∗k and ψ
ck
k as well as σ
2
k
and ψckk . When only a small amount of prior knowledge is encoded in the model we will in
general have a weak dependence between these parameters, and for this situation we con-
jecture that the assumption is approximately correct. Now, based on these two assumptions
we get (see Appendix A for the derivations as well as the expressions (Eqs. (A.5)–(A.6))
for the updated prior distributions):
E(ψ∗j |D) ≈ E
(
ψ∗j | ψˆc1j , . . . , ψˆcNj
)= λ0j · µ0j +
∑N
i=1 ψˆ
ci
j
λ0j + N
, (10)
where ψˆcij = E(ψ cij | ci ).
In order to calculate ψˆ cij = E(ψcij | ci ) we construct a Markov chain for each of the
cases. The state space of each of the chains corresponds to (ψ∗, σ 2,ψci ) and can be repre-
sented by the hyper-cube [0;1]3m, where m is the number of parameters in the true utility
function. From a given chain we can generate a set of samples for the utility function corre-
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sponding to the associated case ci . These samples are then used to approximate the values
in each utility function ψci :
E
[
ψ
ci
j | ci
]=
1∫
ψ
ci
j =0
ψ
ci
j P
(
ψ
ci
j | c¯i
)
dψcij ≈
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj , (11)
where {x1, . . . , xn} are samples from P(ψcij | ci ). The approximated values are then treated
as actual observations of ψci (i.e., they can be seen as a representation of the case), and
used to determine the expected value of each parameter in the true utility function. It is
important to note that the approximated values may not specify a utility function which is
consistent with the case in question. The problem is that the constraints imposed by a case
do not necessarily specify a convex region. Finally, as also described above, the approx-
imated values can also be used to simply estimate the posterior probability distributions
P(ψ∗j , σ 2j | D) ≈ P(ψ∗j , σ 2j | ψˆc1j , . . . , ψˆcNj ) and P(ψ∗j | D) ≈ P(ψ∗j | ψˆc1j , . . . , ψˆcNj ),
see Appendix A for the derivation.
4.2. Method 2
As an alternative to the method above, we can instead iteratively update the prior distrib-
ution, over the true utility function and the variance. This approach facilitates an adaptation
of the probability distributions over the parameters as new cases arrive. However, instead
of updating the joint distribution over the parameters we shall use the set of estimated
posteriors as the new updated prior distributions.
As we only consider one case at a time, we can construct a Markov chain as described
above, i.e., a chain with a state space corresponding to the hyper-cube [0;1]3m. An im-
mediate approach for iteratively updating the prior distribution would then be to use the
generated samples to calculate the maximum likelihood parameters for the joint normal-
gamma distribution. That is, by assuming that the samples for each utility parameter in the
true utility function and the associated precision come from a normal-gamma distribution,
these samples could then be used for calculating the ML parameters of this distribution.
For the utility parameters this is straightforward as we simply need the sample mean. For
the gamma distribution, we need to consider the ML-estimators for both α and β : Assume
that x1, . . . , xn form a sample from a gamma distribution with parameters α and β :
f (x) =


βα
(α)
xα−1 exp(−βx) for x > 0,
0 for x  0.
(12)
Hence, for the joint distribution we have:
L(α,β) =
n∏
i=1
f (xi) = β
nα
[(α)]n
(
n∏
i=1
xi
)α−1
exp
(
−β
n∑
i=1
xi
)
. (13)
When determining the ML estimates for α and β we need to solve the following equation:
ln(α) − ∂
∂α
ln
(
(α)
)= ln(x¯n) − 1
n
n∑
i=1
ln(xi). (14)
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The digamma function, ∂ ln((α)), cannot be evaluated analytically, however, there exists
∂α
several accurate approximations, see [13] for an overview. Based on such an approximation
we can solve the equation using numerical methods, e.g., Newton–Raphson iteration; as a
staring point, the search can be initialized based on the first and second moment:
E(X) = α
β
and E(X2) = α(α + 1)
β2
.
Alternatively, we could directly use the values for α and β s.t. they correspond to the
first and second moment of the samples from the estimated distribution. This avoids the
numerical approximation of the digamma function.
The accuracy of the above two approaches is heavily dependent on P(τj | c) being
(approximately) a gamma distribution. To determine how close P(τj | c) is at being a
gamma distribution, we performed a χ2 goodness-of-fit test w.r.t. samples generated for
the Mildew model in Section 5. As a null-hypothesis we assumed that the samples were
generated from a gamma distribution (using the ML parameters described above), and
this hypothesis was accepted with probability less than 10−30; that the discrepancy also
has an impact on the convergence properties of the algorithm was confirmed by empirical
experiments. As a consequence, we instead calculate the expected value of each utility pa-
rameter for the associate case and used these values to update the distribution over each
parameter in the true utility function and the variance, i.e., we basically apply method 1
iteratively, but only with one case at a time keeping the factorization of the probability dis-
tribution; the actual procedure for updating the probabilities is given by Eqs. (A.5)–(A.6) in
Appendix A. Note that this is an approximation since the distribution does not factorize in
this way after evidence has been inserted. The approximation can, however, be avoided by
using the normal-Wishart prior distribution, but in this case we cannot exploit any inde-
pendence relations during sampling and we would therefore need a larger set of samples to
get an accurate estimate (see Section 4.3).7 It is important to emphasize that even though
this approach can be used to learn a utility function from a database by considering the
cases one at a time, an error from the initial cases (introduced by the approximation) can
propagate to subsequent cases. After convergence, however, we expect that such errors will
have less influence since we are working with a more informed prior distribution; this is
also confirmed by the empirical experiments (see Section 5).
Finally, it should be noted that λj can be used as a fading factor that controls how much
the past should be taken into account when new cases arrive. This could for instance be
used to model that the DM’s utility function shifts over time.
4.3. Constructing the Markov chains
The construction of the Markov Chain now remains to be discussed. First of all,
note that Applegate and Kannan [2] propose a method for sampling from a log-concave
function and approximating the volume of a convex body. However, even though we
are (initially) working with log-concave functions (both the normal distribution and the
7 Note that the updating rules derived in Appendix A can be adapted to the normal-Wishart distribution.
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gamma distribution are log-concave and this class of functions is closed under multipli-
cation) this no longer holds in the truncated case defined by the instantiations. Instead we
use a standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, over the state space for all the parameters
(ψ∗1 , . . . ,ψ∗m,σ 21 , . . . , σ 2m,ψ
c
1 , . . . ,ψ
c
m); we shall use x¯t to denote a configuration for these
parameters at step t and use Xi = xit (for 1 i  3m) to denote the value of the ith parame-
ter at step t . We apply a proposal function q(· | ·) that randomly (with uniform probability)
picks one parameter to change, and then proposes a new value for this parameter according
to a random walk:
x¯t =
[
ψ∗1 , . . . ,ψ∗m,σ 21 , . . . , σ 2m,ψc1, . . . ,ψ
c
k , . . . ,ψ
c
m
]
→ x¯ ′ = [ψ∗1 , . . . ,ψ∗m,σ 21 , . . . , σ 2m,ψc1, . . . , xk, . . . ,ψcm]. (15)
Thus, at most one parameter is changed at each step, and the algorithm accepts this move
with probability:
min
{
1,
P (x¯ ′)q(x¯t | x¯ ′)
P (x¯t )q(x¯ ′ | x¯t )
}
, (16)
given that the state x¯ ′ satisfies the constraints encoded by c; if these constraints are not
satisfied we stay at the current state x¯t , i.e., x¯t+1 = x¯t . Observe that we need not compute
the joint probability P(x¯) as we can exploit the factorization of the probability distribution
when calculating the acceptance probability: E.g., if Xi = ψcj , then:
P(x¯ ′)
P (x¯t )
= P(X
i = x ′ | ψ∗j,t , σ 2j,t )
P (Xi = xit | ψ∗j,t , σ 2j,t )
.
This also applies for the other parameters except that we also have to take their children
into account. That is, for, e.g., Xi = ψ∗j we get:
P(x¯ ′)
P (x¯t )
= P(ψ
c
j,t | Xi = x ′, σ 2j,t )P (Xi = x ′ | σ 2j,t )
P (ψcj,t | Xi = xit , σ 2j,t )P (Xi = xit | σ 2j,t )
.
The algorithm can now be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1. Initialize the Markov Chain at an arbitrary starting point x¯0 s.t. for case ci ,
the utilities ψci1 , . . . ,ψ
ci
m satisfy the constraints induced by that case.8
1. Sample a parameter index i from a uniform distribution over {1,2, . . . ,3m}.
2. Sample a point x ′ from q(· | xit ), where
q
(· | xit )∼ N(xit , σ 2).
3. Set x¯t+1 = x¯ ′ = (x1t , . . . , xi−1t , x ′, xi+1t , . . . , x3·mt ) with probability:
min
{
1,
P (x¯ ′)q(x¯t | x¯ ′)
P (x¯t )q(x¯ ′ | x¯t )
}
,
given that x¯ ′ satisfies the constraints; otherwise stay at the current position.
8 This starting point may simply correspond to any trivial utility function.
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4. Set t := t + 1 and goto step 1.In the algorithm above, it should be noted that we only need to test whether x¯ ′ satisfies
the constraints if Xi corresponds to a parameter in the utility function for case ci .
4.3.1. Testing the proposed utility function
The most computationally intensive step of the algorithms is to determine whether a
proposed parameter change leads to a utility function which induces the case in question;
on average, this test should be performed for every third generated sample since the can-
didate parameter is sampled from a uniform probability distribution over {1,2, . . . ,3m}
(assuming that the candidate point is initially accepted in step 3 of Algorithm 1).
A straightforward approach for performing this test is simply to solve the influence di-
agram w.r.t. the proposed utility function, and then determine if the case is consistent with
the optimal strategy. However, even though this may be computationally feasible for some
domains we can actually avoid some of these calculations. First of all, we need not eval-
uate the influence diagram if the change in parameter value is less than the difference in
expected utility between the optimal decision option and the next best decision option for
each decision variable; if this is the case, then changing the parameter will have no impact
on the optimal strategy (note that this difference should be stored for subsequent evalua-
tions). Secondly, by analyzing the structure of the ID and by reusing previous calculations
we need not perform a complete propagation when testing a new utility function:
• We only need to consider decision variables for which the proposed utility parameter
is relevant, see [19,25].
• No probability potential needs to be updated as only utility parameters are changed,
see also [20].
Note that for the second case we may simply store the probability potentials calculated in
the first propagation, and then reuse these probability potentials in all subsequent propaga-
tions. For example, the lazy propagation architecture [17] facilitates such type of propaga-
tion by maintaining the sets of potentials.
5. Empirical results
In order to test the proposed algorithms we have applied them to the Mildew network and
the Poker network. The Mildew network (depicted in Fig. 2(a)) contains 21 utility parame-
ters in the range [−1;13], and the Poker network (depicted in Fig. 2(b)) contains 4 utility
parameters in the range [−1;3]; the number of possible observation-decision sequences for
the two networks are 1344 and 186624, respectively (ignoring zero probabilities). A more
detailed description of the two networks can be found in [12].
For each of the networks we generated a database of instantiations by first adding white
noise to the utility parameters in the original utility function. Each modified utility function
was then used to sample a single instantiation of the corresponding ID; when generating
a dataset of size N this procedure was therefore performed N times. To measure the ro-
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bustness of the algorithms w.r.t. inconsistent behavior we performed three tests where the
noise added to the utilities were sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0 and with
variance 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We used a burn-in phase of 2000 steps and afterwards
we ran the Markov chains for 98000 steps. For the batch learning approach, the results
(averaged over 10 runs) of the experiments for the Mildew network are shown in Fig. 3.
More precisely, the figure depicts the average expected utility of the learned strategy (i.e.,
the optimal strategy induced by the learned utility function) w.r.t. the true utility function;
the error-bars correspond to the empirical standard deviation and the horizontal lines show
the maximum and minimum expected utility.
For the adaption approach, the results (averaged for 10 runs) of the experiments are
shown in Fig. 4; the figures depict the average expected utility of the learned strategy
w.r.t. the true utility function. As was expected, and which can be seen from the figures,
the amount of noise introduced in the data has an impact on the convergence properties
of the algorithm. Moreover, after convergence, the algorithm exhibit (on average) larger
fluctuations as more noise is introduced: for more than 16 cases, the average empirical
standard deviation is 0.065, 0.079 and 0.194 for the three experiments, respectively.
We also tested how robust the learning algorithms are in situations where the data has
not been generated according to the model. Specifically, we generated databases as de-
scribed previously, however, instead of modifying the values of the utility function with
noise sampled from a normal distribution with fixed variance, we added noise where the
variance of the noise was sampled from a uniform distribution in the interval [0;3]. The
results of the test are depicted in Fig. 5(a). Moreover, we also tested how the adapta-
tion procedure performs when the DM’s behavior shifts (drastically) over time. The test
was performed by employing the adaptation procedure for 20 cases generated as above
with variance 2. Afterwards the values in the original utility function were “reversed”
(producing a radical different behavior) and an additionally 30 cases were generated in
a similar fashion but with the new utility function. The result of the experiment is depicted
in Fig. 5(b), which shows that the algorithm is able to adapt to the changed behavior.
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size of the database (using batch learning); the results are averaged over 10 runs and there are 1344 possible ob-
servation-decision sequences. For figures (a), (b) and (c) the databases were generated by modifying the original
utility function by adding white noise with variance 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Finally, we have made a similar set of tests for the Poker domain. The results for this
domain exhibit the same type of behavior as discussed above. For example, Fig. 6(a) shows
the results (averaged over 10 runs) of applying the batch learning algorithm in the Poker
domain; the database was generated by modifying the original utility function by adding
noise with mean 0 and variance 1.9 Fig. 6(b) shows the application of the adaptation algo-
rithm using the same setting as for the batch learning algorithm. Figs. 6(c) and 6(d) show
the results for the situation where the database was generated by modifying the original
utility function by adding noise with mean 0 and variance 3.
Analogously to the Mildew network, we also tried to simulate a shift in the DM’s prefer-
ences after 20 observations. As before, each observation was sampled after having modified
the original utility function by adding noise with mean 0 and variance 1, and after 20 cases
the values in the original utility function were switched. The result is shown in Fig. 7 which
illustrates that the algorithm is able to take the changed behavior into account during adap-
9 Note that the y-axis has been scaled for illustration purposes.
70 T.D. Nielsen, F.V. Jensen / Artificial Intelligence 160 (2004) 53–78Fig. 4. The figures show the expected utility of the learned strategy for the Mildew network as a function of the
number of cases (using adaptation); the results are averaged over 10 runs and there are 1344 possible observa-
tion-decision sequences. For figures (a), (b) and (c) the cases were generated by modifying the original utility
function by adding white noise with variance 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Fig. 5. Figure (a) shows the expected utility of the learned strategy for the Mildew network averaged over 10 runs
(using adaptation). The databases were generated by modifying the original utility function with noise from a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance sampled from a uniform distribution in the interval [0;3]. Figure (b)
shows the impact of changing the behavior after 20 cases.
T.D. Nielsen, F.V. Jensen / Artificial Intelligence 160 (2004) 53–78 71Fig. 6. The figures show the expected utility of the learned strategy for the Poker network averaged over 10
runs; there are 186624 possible observation-decision sequences. The two databases were generated by modifying
the original utility function with noise from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The results in
figure (a) were generated by the batch learning algorithm, and the results in figure (b) were generated by the
adaptation algorithm. Figures (c) and (d) show the results for the situation where the database was generated by
modifying the original utility function by adding noise with mean 0 and variance 3.
Fig. 7. The figure show the expected utility of the learned strategy for the Poker network as a function of the
number of cases (using adaptation); there are 186624 possible observation-decision sequences. After 20 cases the
values in the original utility function were shifted to simulate a change in the DM’s preference. All observations
were generated by modifying the original utility function by adding noise with mean 0 and variance 1.
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tation. In the following section we shall discuss different methods for detecting such shifts
in preferences (to obtain a faster convergence) which could be taken into account during
adaptation.
6. Discussion and future work
As previously mentioned, the most computationally intensive step of the algorithms is
to test whether a proposed move leads to a utility function which is consistent with the case
in question. As an alternative to the methods proposed in Section 4.3.1, one could instead
pose the problem as performing a type of sensitivity analysis, see, e.g., [9,20]. However, it
is important to notice that there is a fundamental difference in the two problems: we seek
to determine whether changing a parameter leads to a utility function which induces an
optimal strategy including the case in question, whereas sensitivity analysis has to do with
changes in the optimal strategy. This also implies that the methods proposed in, e.g., [20]
cannot immediately be applied; these methods rely on the expected utility functions being
linear in the utilities, and this only holds when the optimal strategy is known (i.e., in our
case, fully encoded in the database).
Thus, in order to apply the methods described by Nielsen and Jensen [20] we could
instead induce the “missing” cases: Start with the last decision, Dn, and determine the
linear inequalities corresponding to each case by restricting them to Dn, see Eq. (6). Next,
use these inequalities for checking the constraints in step 3 of Algorithm 1 and determine
a utility function for each of the cases (again restricted to Dn). After the utility functions
have been found we calculate an optimal policy for each case, and continue to decision
Dn−1. Now, in order to compute the required inequalities for decision Dn−1 (for a given
case) we first substitute decision Dn with its chance variable representation (determined
by the optimal policy induced by the utility function identified in the previous step), and
decision Dn−1 is then treated as the last decision. This procedure then continues to the first
decision variable, where all unrestricted cases are considered.
Algorithm 2. Let D be a database consisting of N cases {c1, . . . , cN }, where each case
specifies a realization of a strategy for the influence diagram I with decision variables
{D1, . . . ,Dn} ordered by their indexes.
1. Set i := n.
2. Repeat
3. For each case c, calculate the expected value for all parameters ψcj .
4. Use the estimated values to complete the optimal policy for decision Di in each case.
5. For each case substitute decision Di with its chance variable policy.
6. Set i := i − 1.
7. Until i = 0.
Note that as all the inequalities encode convex sets we are always working with a con-
vex set during sampling; these sets are closed under intersection. Thus we can apply the
sampling method proposed by Applegate and Kannan [2].
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An interesting approach for making the learning algorithm more robust, could be to
weight the contribution from each case (i.e., changing the updating rule for λj ) in propor-
tion to the probability of actually seeing that case. By weighting each case we can ensure
that cases with low probability have less impact on the learning procedure; this is consis-
tent with their contribution to the maximum expected utility. Moreover, by observing the
“case probabilities” during adaptation we could, e.g., use the occurrence of low probability
cases as an indication of a shift in the DM’s preferences (producing a different behavior);
thereby being able to change the value of λj accordingly and allowing a more rapid adapta-
tion. Furthermore, it could be interesting to extend the proposed algorithm to handle cases
with missing values. One obvious approach to this problem would be to induce the missing
data, however, it is not completely apparent how these (partially induced) cases should be
weighted as compared to fully observed cases.
Finally, as also discussed in Section 3, we could base the learning methods on a descrip-
tive model of the DM rather than a prescriptive. That is, acknowledging that humans rarely
behave as to maximize the expected utility, we could for instance use the rank dependent
utility (RDU) model by Quiggin [21] during learning. In the RDU model, there are two pa-
rameters: (i) a utility function u(·) which is cardinal and represents the DM’s preferences
under certainty, and (ii) a probability transformation (or weighting) function q(·), which is
strictly increasing from [0,1] onto itself. The utility V (L)u,q of a single stage lottery L is
determined as follows.10 First, the components of L are re-indexed in increasing order of
their utility:
L = (c1,p1; . . . ; ci,pi; . . . ; cn,pn) with u(c1) · · · u(ci) · · · u(cn). (17)
Then, its utility is evaluated as:
V (L)u,q =
n∑
i=1
u(ci)
[
q
(
n∑
j=i
pj
)
− q
(
n∑
j=i+1
pj
)]
or, equivalently as
V (L)u,q = u(c1) +
n∑
i=2
[
u(ci) − u(ci−1)
]
q
(
n∑
j=i
pj
)
.
The crucial idea underlying the RDU model is that the utility of each consequence is given
a variable weight, which depends on both its probability and on its ranking w.r.t. the other
consequences of the lottery. The second expression suggests that the DM bases his evalua-
tion on the probabilities of achieving at least such or such utility level. Note, however, that
RDU theory no longer satisfies the independence axiom, and we cannot directly exploit the
properties of dynamic programming [3] when dealing with sequential decision problems.
That is, the RDU model is computationally more intensive to work with as compared to
the EU model, and the integration of the model into the learning procedure is a subject for
future research.
10 Note that under the reduction of compound lotteries assumption, any sequential decision problem can be
transformed into a single stage lottery.
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7. ConclusionIn this paper we have proposed two algorithms for learning a DM’s utility function
based on observed (possible inconsistent) behavior. The algorithms extend previous pro-
posed algorithms by explicitly taking into account that there may not exist a non-trivial
utility function which can account for all the observed behavioral patterns, i.e., behavior
which jointly appear inconsistent w.r.t. any utility function. The proposed algorithms are
based on the assumption that inconsistent behavior can be explained as deviations from an
underlying true utility function, and as such it can, e.g., (i) represent (or encode) inaccura-
cies in the model being applied [26], and (ii) model a DM whose utility function fluctuates
and/or changes permanently over time. The main difference in the two algorithms is that
the first algorithm can be seen as a form of batch learning whereas the second algorithm
focuses on adaptation. Empirical results demonstrated the applicability of both algorithms,
which converged to the true utility function even for very small databases. Additionally, it
was shown that rapid permanent shifts in the utility functions can also be taken into account
during adaptation.
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Appendix A. Proofs
In order to estimate E(ψ∗j |D) we first note that:
P
(
ψ∗, σ 2 |D)
=
∫
ψc1
· · ·
∫
ψcN
P
(
ψ∗, σ 2,ψc1, . . . ,ψcN |D)dψc1 . . .dψcN
=
∫
ψc1
· · ·
∫
ψcN
P
(
ψ∗, σ 2 | ψc1 , . . . ,ψcN ,D)P (ψc1, . . . ,ψcN |D)dψc1 . . .dψcN
=
∫
ψc1
· · ·
∫
ψcN
P
(
ψ∗, σ 2 | ψc1 , . . . ,ψcN )P (ψc1, . . . ,ψcN |D) dψc1 . . .dψcN
=
∫
ψ1¯
· · ·
∫
ψm¯
(
m∏
j=1
P
(
ψ∗j , σ 2j | ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj
))
× P (ψc1, . . . ,ψcN |D)dψ1¯ . . .dψm¯. (A.1)
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In particularP
(
ψ∗j , σ 2j |D
)= ∫
ψ
c1
j
· · ·
∫
ψ
cN
j
P
(
ψ∗j , σ 2j | ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj
)
× P (ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj |D) dψc1j . . .dψcNj . (A.2)
In order to calculate the term P(ψ∗j , σ 2j | ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj ) on closed form we need a
conjugate prior distribution for the true utility function and the variance. First, recall that
the conditional probability distribution for the utility parameter ψcij of some case ci is
a normal distribution which, for notational convenience, can be described in terms of its
precision τj = 1/σ 2j :
ψ
ci
j ∼ N(ψ∗j , τj ) =
(
τj
2π
)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
τj
(
ψ
ci
j − ψ∗j
)2]
. (A.3)
A possible conjugate family of joint prior distributions for ψ∗j (the mean) and τj (the
precision), is the joint normal-gamma distribution specified by the conditional distribution
of ψ∗j given τj and the marginal distribution of τj :
P
(
ψ∗j | τj ,µ0j , λ0j
)= (λ0j τj
2π
)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
λ0j τj
(
ψ∗j − µ0j
)2]
,
P
(
τj | α0j , β0j
)=


(β0j )
α0j
(α0j )
τ
α0j−1
j e
−β0j τj for τj > 0,
0 for τj  0
(A.4)
for −∞ < µ0j < ∞, λ0j > 0, α0j > 0 and β0j > 0. That is, the conditional distribution of ψ∗j
given τj is a normal distribution with mean µ0j and precision λ
0
j τj , whereas the marginal
distribution for τj is a gamma distribution with parameters α0j and β
0
j . Note that λ
0
j can
be see as a virtual sample size, which can be used to control how certain we are about the
distribution.
In the general case, suppose now that X1,X2, . . . ,Xn form a random sample from a
normal distribution for which both the mean µ and the precision τ are unknown. If the
joint prior distribution of µ and τ is as specified above, then the joint posterior of µ and τ ,
given that Xi = xi (∀1 i  n) is as follows: The conditional distribution of µ given τ is
a normal distribution with mean µ1 and precision λ1τ , where:
µ1 = λ
0µ0 + nx¯n
λ0 + n and λ
1 = λ0 + n; (A.5)
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x¯n is the sample mean, and the marginal distribution of τ is a gamma distribution with
parameters α1 and β1:11
α1 = α0 + n
2
and β1 = β0 + 1
2
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯n)2 + nλ
0(x¯n − µ0)2
2(λ0 + n) . (A.6)
In particular, we can find the expected value of µ (corresponding to the parameters of
the true utility function) since E(µ) = µ1 and Var(µ) = β1
λ1(α1−1) .
12 Thus, we have:
E
(
ψ∗j |D
)
=
∫
ψ
c1
j
· · ·
∫
ψ
cN
j
E
(
ψ∗j | ψc1j , . . . ,ψcNj
)
P
(
ψ
c1
j , . . . ,ψ
cN
j |D
)
dψc1j . . .dψ
cN
j
=
∫
ψ
c1
j
· · ·
∫
ψ
cN
j
(
λ0jµ
0
j +
∑N
i=1 ψ
ci
j
λ0j +N
)
P
(
ψ
c1
j , . . . ,ψ
cN
j |D
)
dψc1j . . .dψ
cN
j
= λ
0
jµ
0
j
λ0j + N
+ 1
λ0j + N
∫
ψ
c1
j
· · ·
∫
ψ
cN
j
N∑
i=1
ψ
ci
j P
(
ψ
c1
j , . . . ,ψ
cN
j |D
)
dψc1j . . .dψ
cN
j
= λ
0
jµ
0
j
λ0j + N
+ 1
λ0j + N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ
c1
j
· · ·
∫
ψ
cN
j
ψ
ci
j P
(
ψ
c1
j , . . . ,ψ
cN
j |D
)
dψc1j . . .dψ
cN
j
= λ
0
jµ
0
j
λ0j + N
+ 1
λ0j + N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ
ci
j
ψ
ci
j P
(
ψ
ci
j |D
)
dψcij . (A.7)
We shall approximate this expression by assuming that P(ψcij | D) ≈ P(ψcij | ci ). The
accuracy of this approximation is heavily dependent on the strength of the dependence
between ψ∗k and ψ
ci
k as well as σ
2
k and ψ
ck
k ; with little prior knowledge encoded in the
model these dependencies will be weak (encoded by a large variance or small λ). Given
this assumption, E(ψ∗j |D) can now be expressed as:
E(ψ∗j |D) ≈
λ0jµ
0
j
λ0j + N
+ 1
λ0j + N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ
ci
j
ψ
ci
j P
(
ψ
ci
j | ci
)
dψcij
11 Note also that when updating the prior distribution based on a random sample of size n we also increase the
virtual sample size λ0 with n.
12 This is actually an approximation as the normal-gamma probability distribution only serves as a conjugate
prior for the unrestricted normal distribution and not when it is truncated.
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λ0jµ
0
j 1
N∑
c=
λ0j + N
+
λ0j + N i=1
ψˆ ij
= λ
0
jµ
0
j +
∑N
i=1 ψˆ
ci
j
λ0j + N
= E(ψ∗j | ψˆc1j , . . . , ψˆcNj ), (A.8)
where ψˆci = E(ψ ci | ci ).
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